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A B S T R A C T
Since slightly more than half of the countries that recognize Taiwan are located in 
Latin America and the Caribbean –LAC–, Taipei and Beijing have been striving 
to achieve diplomatic recognition in the region, using development aid as a 
foreign policy tool to gain diplomatic partners. This article analyzes statements by 
governmental officers and previous literature, as well as quantitative development 
aid data, in order to assess the impact of Taiwanese aid program in LAC. It 
concludes that Taipei has indeed some leverage to contain China’s advancement 
in the region, due to its status of democratic country, its history of successful 
development and, especially, its strong ties with Washington. Nevertheless, in 
the face of China’s renewed efforts in imposing its “One China Policy”, Taiwan’s 
possibilities to avoid diplomatic isolation remain uncertain.
KEYWORDS: Taiwan, foreign aid, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, China, One China Policy.   
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R E S U M E N
Dado que poco más de la mitad de los países que reconocen a Taiwán se encuentran en 
América Latina y el Caribe, Taipéi y Pekín se han esforzado por lograr reconocimiento 
diplomático en la región, utilizando programas de ayuda para el desarrollo para 
conseguir socios diplomáticos. Este artículo analiza las declaraciones de los funcionarios 
gubernamentales y la literatura anterior, así como los datos cuantitativos de la ayuda 
para el desarrollo, a fin de evaluar el impacto del programa de ayuda taiwanés en ALC. 
Se concluye que Taipéi tiene cierta influencia para contener el avance de China en 
la región, debido a su estatus de país democrático, su historia de desarrollo exitoso y, 
especialmente, sus fuertes vínculos con Washington. Sin embargo, frente a los renovados 
esfuerzos de China para imponer su política de “Una Sola China”, las posibilidades de 
Taiwán de evitar el aislamiento diplomático siguen siendo inciertas.
P A L A B R A S C L A V E: Taiwán, ayuda exterior, América 
Latina y el Caribe, China, política de una sola China. 
R E S U M O
Devido a que mais da metade dos países que reconhecem a Taiwan encontram-se em 
América Latina e o Caribe, Taipei e Pequim têm se esforçado em atingir reconhecimento 
diplomático na região, utilizando programas de ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Este artigo 
analisa as declarações dos funcionários governamentais e a literatura anterior, bem como 
os dados quantitativos da ajuda ao desenvolvimento, com o intuito de avaliar o impacto 
do programa de ajuda taiwanês em ALC. Conclui-se que Taipei tem certa influência 
para conter o avanço de China na região, devido a seu status de país democrático, sua 
história de desenvolvimento bem-sucedido e, especialmente, seus fortes vínculos com 
Washington. Entretanto, face os renovados esforços de China para impor sua política de 
“Uma China”, as possibilidades de Taiwan de evitar o isolamento diplomático seguem 
sendo incertas.
PALAVR AS-CHAVE:  Taiwan, ajuda exterior, América Latina e 
o Caribe, China, política de “Uma China”.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The topic of Taiwanese development assistance to Latin America and 
the Caribbean is strictly related to the topic of the Cross-Strait relations, 
since it has an impact on the decision of recipient countries to maintain 
diplomatic relations with Taipei. In fact, since the end of Chinese Civil 
War in 1949, Taiwan and China have been competing for diplomatic 
recognition in the international arena, and development aid has been a 
fundamental instrument of foreign policy for both the Republic of China 
(ROC, Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, China). After 
Beijing replaced Taipei in the United Nations in 1971, Taiwan’s struggle for 
recognition has become more intense, especially in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, where slightly more than half of those countries that maintains 
diplomatic ties with the Republic of China are located (as of June of 2019, 
nine out of seventeen). Despite being diplomatically isolated, since the 
1970s and 1980s Taiwan has experienced an extraordinary economic 
growth (being one of the so-called “Four Asian Tigers”), becoming one 
of the world main exporters of manufactured products, and therefore 
accumulating large amount of foreign currency reserves (the sixth in 
the world according to IMF, 2019), which in turn enabled Taipei to use 
its economic advantages to pursue ambitious foreign aid programs. The 
primary goal of Taiwanese cooperation is to retain diplomatic recognition, 
but also breaking its isolation and maintaining the possibility to participate 
in a variety of international forums and multilateral organizations 
(especially those that do not require statehood, such as the International 
Civil Aviation Organization and the WHA/WHO) (Lu & Hsiao, 2018).
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Taiwan represents a special case among the community of 
emerging donors, since its foreign aid policy is so strictly connected 
to its foreign policy strategy (Tubilewicz, 2016, p. 45), to the point 
that “the enhancement of international status has continually been 
the most important determinant in Taiwan’s foreign aid policy-
making” (Lin & Lin, 2017).
Most authors generally agree that the delivery of development aid 
constitutes an effective instrument of public diplomacy. With this strategy, 
Taiwan could indefinitely trade development assistance with diplomatic 
recognition from small and micro-states (Wang, 2002, p. 99). This posture 
is especially evident within literature from the 1990s, when Taiwan indeed 
achieved increasing its international diplomatic recognition from 22 
countries in 1988 to 30 by the mid-1990s (Hsieh, 1985; Lee, 1993; Lin, 
1990; Cheng, 1994; Hickey, 1994; Lin, 1995; Wang, 1995; Wu, 1995; Lin, 
1996; Moeller, 1996; Chan, 1997; Rubinstein, 1999; Lee, 2004; Liu, 2009).
Nevertheless, several authors also noted the geostrategic weaknesses 
of such an instrument of foreign policy (Cheng, 1994; Lee, 1994; Wu, 1995; 
Hsieh, 1996; Chan, 1997; Chen, 2002). In fact, Taiwanese development 
aid was unsuccessful in preventing the PRC’s UN recognition and neither 
achieved preventing the continuous loss of diplomatic recognition from 
countries all around the world, nor was very successful in its efforts 
to be readmitted in international organizations (Hsieh, 1996, p. 104). 
Undoubtedly, ROC’s diplomatic aspirations were frustrated by Beijing’s 
plan to enforce the One China policy, on the one hand by using its 
increasing financial and commercial leverage, and on the other hand 
by focusing its development aid to countries likely to recognize Taiwan 
(Erikson & Chen, 2007; Tubilewicz, 2007; Tubilewicz & Guilloux, 
2011). However, the emphasis on Taiwanese foreign aid as a diplomatic 
instrument has remained central, mostly linking ROC’s aid to its foreign 
policy, and thus to Cross Strait relations.
This article is dedicated to the topic of Taiwan’s foreign aid to Latin 
America and the Caribbean as connected to the issue of the diplomatic 
recognition of Taiwan by countries in the region. What is the impact of 
Taiwanese aid to Latin America and the Caribbean over its diplomatic 
recognition in the region, antagonized by the One China policy? Foreign 
aid, as a tool of foreign policy, may help Taipei to retain diplomatic 
recognition and avoid international isolation. Nevertheless, China’s 
renewed efforts to encourage LAC countries to discontinue official ties 
with the ROC may prevail. 
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To research this topic I will mostly use methods of qualitative nature 
(such as the analysis of declarations and statements by governmental 
officers and systematization previous literature), supported by quantitative 
data on Taiwanese aid flows when available. In the first section of this 
article, I will introduce the historical background of Taiwan and the 
Republic of China, such as European colonization of the island, the 
Japanese conquest, the establishment of the Republic of China, the 
Chinese civil war, the economic miracle, the process of democratization, 
etc. In the second section, I will offer a description of the antagonism 
between China and Taiwan for diplomatic recognition in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and the use of foreign aid as a foreign policy tool in the 
context of the “One China policy”. Furthermore, I will evaluate the future 
possibilities for Taiwan in the region. In the third section, I will describe 
more in detail Taiwanese foreign aid and its policies, as well as providing 
an attempt to quantify the amounts and the number of projects directed to 
LAC region. I will describe potential developments for Taiwan’s remaining 
diplomatic partners. As an anticipation, the article concludes that Taipei 
has indeed some means to gain leverage facing China’s advancement in 
the region, due to its foreign aid program; its status of democratic country 
upholding Western values and human rights; its successful history of 
development, and, especially, its strong ties with Washington. Nevertheless, 
its possibilities to avoid diplomatic isolation and to maintain its diplomatic 
relations in the region (especially regarding countries in the Caribbean) 
remain uncertain.
Taiwan and the Republic of China: 
historical background
Taiwan Island, also known as Formosa (from Portuguese Ilha Formosa) 
is an island in the Pacific Ocean, distant around 180km from the South-
Eastern coast of mainland China. Taiwan is a sizeable island, around 
four times the size of other islands like Jamaica, Puerto Rico or Cyprus, 
and about the same size as Costa Rica. Its interior is quite mountainous, 
reaching an altitude of 3,952 meters, and most the population of 23 
million is concentrated in its coasts. Taiwan (as known as “Formosa and 
the Pescadores”) also includes the Penghu or Pescadores Islands, an 
archipelago of 90 small islands in the Taiwan Strait, as well as Kinmen 
and Matsu islands, which are geographically described as being part of 
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mainland China rather than Taiwan. Formosa island has been inhabited 
since its prehistory by aboriginal people of Malay-Austronesian origin, 
with few contacts with outsiders until the arrival of the Europeans in the 
XVI-XVII century. The Portuguese, the Spanish and the Dutch competed 
with local tribes for the control of the island until 1683, when Taiwan 
was formally annexed by the Chinese Qing Dynasty and a substantial 
Han Chinese immigration began. In 1887, Taiwan was upgraded to the 
status of Prefecture of the Chinese Empire, with its capital in Taipei. 
Subsequently, following the Chinese defeat in the First Sino-Japanese 
War (1894-1895), Taiwan was formally annexed to the Japanese Empire. 
Japanese colonization was instrumental to the island’s modernization, 
industrialization and economic growth, together with the establishment 
of a formal sanitation and education system. During World War II Taiwan 
was bombed by the US as part of its operations against Japan, and in 1945, 
after Japanese Empire’s surrender at the end of the war, 300.000 Japanese 
settlers were expelled by the island. Japan then renounced to the island, 
introducing the problem of the international legal status of Taiwan.
In the meanwhile, in 1912 (while Taiwan was still under Japanese 
rule), after over two thousand years of Imperial rule over China, the 
Republic of China was established, under the authoritarian control of 
the nationalist party Kuomintang (KMT) led by its founder Sun Yat-Sen. 
The KMT had to face numerous internal revolts, the Japanese invasion 
(1937–45), and, finally, the Chinese Civil War against Mao Zedong’s 
Chinese Communist Party, fought intermittently between 1927 and 1949. 
The Republic of China took control of Taiwan from the Japanese in 1945, 
not without anti-government uprisings by local people, violently repressed 
by the KMT’s Chinese Nationalists with thousands of victims. There were 
several incidents of repression such the “228 incident” in 1947, which gave 
the start to a period of assassination of dissidents known as “white terror” 
(Manthorpe, 2016, pp. 201-210). 
After Mao’s victory in mainland China and the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China 
and the KMT retreated to Taiwan, together with two millions Chinese 
mainlanders, including business and intellectual elites, taking to Taipei 
a large amount of China’s national treasures and most of its gold and 
foreign currency reserves. While the Republic of China continued claiming 
sovereignty over all of China, the Chinese Communist Party claimed 
that the ROC no longer existed and started to consider Taiwan as a rebel 
province. Both of them claimed to be China’s legitimate government.
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The communist offensive to retake Taiwan continued until 1950, with 
the conquest of Hainan Island, Wanshan Islands and Zhoushan Island, but 
the start of the Korean War in the same year prevented further conflict 
between PRC and ROC. This event distracted Communist China’s army 
and instigated the interposition of the US fleet in the Taiwan Strait as part 
of the American containment policy against the communist advancement. 
In fact, Mao privileged the Korean question over the Taiwanese question, 
which he initially considered a low priority “left-over issue” of the Chinese 
civil war (Friedman, 2007, p. 121). 
Nevertheless, in the following years the Taiwanese question increased 
its relevance. On the one hand, the Sino-American Mutual Defense 
treaty between ROC and the US was signed in 1955. On the other hand, 
the slogan “we must liberate Taiwan” became central in Mao’s Chinese 
popular sentiment campaign, aimed at driving the Chinese people to 
join his Great Leap Forward movement in 1958 (Friedman, 2007, p. 122). 
Subsequently, in Taiwan, ROC’s leader Chiang Kai-Shek worked until his 
death (in 1975) to militarize and fortify the island, which was “transformed 
into an unsinkable aircraft carrier” of the anti-communist forces in 
East Asia (Tubilewicz, 2007, p. 26). The Kuomintang ruled Taiwan as an 
authoritarian one-party regime and established the martial law from 1949 
to 1987. 
At the beginning, because of a widespread anticommunism, most 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean sided with Taipei, which 
(with the approval of the US) was still holding Chinese seat in the UN 
Security Council. In 1971, following a rapprochement with Washington 
(due the common enmity with the Soviet Union), Chinese UN seat 
was assigned to Beijing, and thus most countries gradually switched 
their recognition to the PRC. In 1979 the United States finally also 
recognized the PRC, and discontinue their diplomatic ties with the ROC. 
Simultaneously, they approved the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which 
promotes a special (but non-diplomatic) relationship between the people 
of the United States and Taiwan.
On the economic level, in the 1960s, Taiwan (and the other Asian 
Tigers such as South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) was considered 
part of the underdeveloped world. In this phase, it is important to 
remember the contribution of US financial and economic aid to support 
the ROC in establishing its economic structure (Chang, 1965; Butterfield, 
2004). In the following decades between the 1960s and the 1980s, Taiwan 
and other East Asian Countries were able to achieve an extraordinary 
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economic growth, not only becoming an advanced industrialized country, 
but also achieving at the same time a reduction in income inequality. 
This phenomenon that has been known as the “East Asian Economic 
Miracle” is considered among the most important events in the global 
economic history (Thomas & Stephens, 1994). In the decade of the 1980s, 
Taiwanese government decided to focus on innovating technology, starting 
a period of government-supported heavy investment in high technology 
and modernization (1981-1990). They invested, especially, in Research & 
Development and computer components technology (monitors, desktops 
and motherboards). In the decade of the 1990s, Taiwan further focused 
on the information technologies and service economy. By the year 2000, 
Taiwanese companies were responsible for approximately 75% of the entire 
global production of computer motherboards (Kenney, 2004, p. 137). It 
is noteworthy to underline that such a rise as a global exporter has been 
achieved despite the lack of international diplomatic recognition. In 1989, 
in fact, only 5 percent of Taiwanese trade was directed to partners with 
official diplomatic relations with the ROC (Lee, 1993, p. 43).
Beyond trade, in the 1980s and the 1990s, Taiwan underwent as well 
severe social and political reforms, including a process of democratization 
which finally ended KMT authoritarian one-party rule in 1996 with 
the first democratic presidential elections. In the year 2000, the first 
non-Kuomintang (KMT) President was elected, Chen Shui-bian of the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Apart of free elections and an 
independent judiciary system, Taiwan’s democracy is also reinforced by the 
strength of their civil society organizations and middle class activism. In 
terms of political freedom, Taiwan is ranked as the second freest country 
in Asia after Japan (with a score of 93 out of 100) (Freedom House, 2018).
Today, Taiwanese politics continue being polarized over the issue of 
the relations with China. On the one hand, the KMT, leading the Pan-
Blue coalition, supporting the status quo and still favoring the possibility 
of a reunification with the mainland. On the other hand, the Democratic 
Progressive Party –DPP–, leading the pan-green Coalition, eventually 
desiring an official declaration of independence, even though, in practice, 
it also supports the status quo because it cannot afford the risk of 
provoking a reaction from China. 
Nowadays, 176 countries in the world hold diplomatic relations with 
Beijing, while Taiwan, considered by Beijing a nonaligned province, only 
retains full diplomatic relations with 17 countries, as well as embassies, 
trade agreements and foreign aid programs. Furthermore, the ROC 
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maintains non-official diplomatic relations with the EU and with dozens of 
states that recognize the PRC through de facto embassies. These institutions 
are named alternatively Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative 
Office (TECRO), Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO), Taipei 
Representative Office (TRO), among others. Those offices perform regular 
consular activities (e.g. visas and passports issuance) as well as promoting 
“bilateral trade, investment, culture, science and technology exchanges 
and cooperation, as well as better understanding” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2019).
Taiwan-China competition for Latin 
America and the One-China policy
Originating from the end of the Chinese civil war, the so-called “One 
China policy” is a cornerstone of PRC’s foreign policy relations. It consists 
in the acknowledgment that only one China exists and, as a consequence, 
other countries must recognize only one Chinese government and cannot 
establish diplomatic relations with both the People’s Republic of China and 
the Republic of China. The One-China policy is particularly relevant for 
Latin America and the Caribbean since the region is the epicenter of the 
diplomatic struggle between China and Taiwan. In fact, the slight majority 
of countries holding Taiwanese recognition (nine out of seventeen, 
as shown by Table 1 below) is located in this region, and particularly 
in Central America, which sustain this arrangement because Taiwan 
spends heavily to maintain it. As a response, since the 1980s, China also 
strengthened its so-called “checkbook diplomacy”, offering aid, loans and 
investment to Taiwan’s diplomatic allies. This is a sort of a “bidding war” in 
which offers of foreign assistance by both sides escalated (Brautigam, 2010, 
p.11; Rich, 2009). This strategy has been evident in LAC, where both China 
and Taiwan invested in costly projects, sometimes in exchange for ending 
diplomatic relations with the other party.
However, Taiwan can difficultly outspend mainland China, which 
admittedly uses the aid to impose its “One China policy”, rewarding 
countries that do not recognize Taiwan as a separate country. (Taylor, 
1998; Brautigam, 2008; Rich, 2009). In fact, as openly specified as one of 
the four “goals” of Chinese official policy toward Latin America and the 
Caribbean:
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The one China principle is the political basis for the establishment 
and development of relations between China and Latin American and 
Caribbean countries and regional organizations. The overwhelming 
majority of countries in the region are committed to the one China 
policy and the position of supporting China’s reunification and not 
having official ties or contacts with Taiwan. The Chinese Government 
appreciates such a stance. China is ready to establish and develop state-
to-state relations with all Latin American and Caribbean countries 
based on the one China principle. (China’s Policy Paper on Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 2008)
Historically, nevertheless, China had a difficult time to establish 
diplomatic relations with LAC countries. In the 1950s and 1960s, due to 
the widespread anticommunism among LAC governments, only La Havana 
recognized the PRC (and even its relationship with Cuba was not easy 
due to Castro’s close ties with the URSS). In this period, the competition 
with the mainland and the One-China policy prompted the beginning of 
Taiwan’s foreign aid program as a tool of public diplomacy (Hsieh 1985, p. 
210; Lin, 1990, p. 151). Initially, Taiwan sought diplomatic recognition from 
the newly-decolonized states (in Africa and elsewhere) in order to gather 
Countries recognizing
the PRC (China)
Countries recognizing
the ROC (Taiwan)
Central 
America
México, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Panamá
Belize (1989), Guatemala (1993), 
Honduras (1941), Nicaragua (1962-
1985; 1990)
Caribbean
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, 
Trinidad & Tobago
Haití (1956), St. Kitts & Nevis (1983), 
St. Lucía (1984-1997; 2007), St. 
Vincent & the Grenadines (1981)
South 
America
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Uruguay, 
Venezuela
Paraguay (1957)
Source: Compiled by the author based on information from the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations of the Republic of China (Taiwan) website: http://www.mofa.gov.
tw/
Table 1. Countries recognizing the PRC or the ROC in Latin America and the 
Caribbean in July 2019
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support for the Taiwanese cause, facing Beijing’s impending bid for UN 
membership (Hsieh, 1985, p. 171).
Following Washington’s rapprochement with Beijing in the 1970s and 
the subsequent acceptance of Beijing’s UN membership claims,1 China 
adopted a more pragmatic stance in LAC region. Several military and 
authoritarian regimes became closer to China as a way to contrast Soviet 
influence. During the 1970s, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, Argentina, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Brazil, Suriname, 
Barbados, in chronological order, recognized the PRC. They were followed 
in the 1980s by Colombia, Antigua, Bolivia, Grenada, Nicaragua, and 
Uruguay. In 1988, Taiwan created the Overseas Economic Cooperation 
and Development Fund (renamed the International Economic 
Cooperation and International Development Fund in 1991). Through 
the delivery of financial (loans and concessional loans) and technical aid 
(mostly in the primary sector), Taiwan achieved in the following years 
official diplomatic recognition by several Caribbean nations (Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, the 
Bahamas, Grenada, Belize and Nicaragua). Belize established diplomatic 
ties with the PRC between 1987 and 1989, but when it adopted a “Two-
Chinas policy” (recognizing China and Taiwan as separate independent 
states and establishing diplomatic ties with both of them), Beijing 
rescinded its diplomatic relations with Belmopan.
Following Taiwan’s economic flourishing at the beginning of the 
1990s, several important PRC’s diplomatic allies in LAC (e.g. Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico) opened in Taipei their respective 
“commercial representative offices”. Taipei started to participate from 
1991 in the Summits of Central American Countries and encouraged 
Taiwanese enterprises to invest in the region to consolidate its political 
ties. After Taipei deposited 150 million USD into the Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration, Taiwan’s Central American allies 
supported its (unsuccessful) petition for ROC’s return to the UN in 1993 
(Esteban, 2007). In 1998, Taipei created the Aid Fund for the Development 
of Central America and, in the following years, it strengthened its 
1 In Latin America and the Caribbean, six countries (Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, México, Perú, 
and Trinidad and Tobago) voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 2758 
of 1971 on the subject of the “Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China 
in the United Nations”, four abstained (Argentina, Colombia, Jamaica and Panamá) and ten 
voted against (Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haití, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay).
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cooperation with Paraguay, its strongest diplomatic allied in South 
America. Furthermore, in 2006, it created the program “Study in Taiwan” 
to enhance the cultural and academic exchange with the region. As 
it can be noted, Taipei has taken the opportunity to create ties with 
smaller countries which are more in need of development assistance. 
Larger countries with higher international projection, in contrast, have a 
preference for the commercial and economic ties that Beijing can offer (Li, 
2005; Esteban, 2007). To counteract Taiwanese action, since 1997 Beijing 
has established the delivery of several aid packages to Central America 
and the Caribbean, which were followed by a change in recognition from 
Bahamas and Saint Lucia (1997, switching back to ROC in 2007), Dominica 
(2004) and Grenada (2005). When Costa Rica changed its recognition 
status to the PRC in 2007, China provided an extremely generous aid 
package that included a new soccer stadium (83 million USD), the 
purchase of government bonds (300 million USD), the construction of a 
highway and other public works, a joint venture to develop the national 
petroleum refinery (1 billion USD), and a facilitated access to PRC markets 
for Costa Rican coffee and other products (Ellis, 2011, p. 89).
In 2008, China and Taiwan agreed a sort of “diplomatic truce”, 
deciding to stop the use of financial incentives to achieve diplomatic 
recognition from each other’s diplomatic allies (Koleski & Blivas, 
2018, p.18). Nevertheless, following Tsai Ing-Wen election as President 
of the ROC in 2016, Beijing “suspended contact with their Taiwanese 
counterparts because the island’s new leader would not endorse the idea of 
a single Chinese nation” (Hernández, 2016). Subsequently, Beijing renewed 
its efforts to diplomatically isolate Taiwan. Since then, six countries ceased 
recognition of the ROC (three in LAC). In June 2017, in a major success for 
Chinese foreign relations, Panama (the most important partner country 
for Taipei in Central America, with diplomatic relations with the ROC 
since 1922), switched recognition to the PRC. China, in fact, is the second 
greatest user of its channel, given that “an estimated 40 percent of all 
traffic going through the canal is tied to China in one way or another” 
(Ellis, 2009, p. 227). Recognition by Panama is in line with the hypothesis 
that countries with higher socioeconomic development tend to recognize 
Beijing because they can benefit in a greater level from trade and financial 
relationship with the PRC. Finally, El Salvador (after Taipei refused 
to donate an “astronomical amount” of financial aid requested by San 
Salvador) and Dominican Republic (encouraged by loans and investments 
by Beijing amounting to US$3.1 billion) have been the latest countries in 
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establishing relations with the Beijing, ceasing relations with the ROC in 
2018 (see Table 1 above). In conclusion, Beijing’s decision to invest more 
resources into LAC region (in terms of development aid, investments, and 
trade relations) could prompt the remaining nine Taiwanese political allies 
to switch recognition in favor of China. Chinese authorities have been 
cautious in this respect, largely due to the possible repercussions over its 
relations with the United States. However, in the last two decades Beijing 
assumed a more active stance and achieved several major diplomatic 
accomplishments, among which the most important is the recognition 
by Panama. China’s commitment to extend its Belt and Road Initiative 
to LAC region indicates that Beijing will continue to dedicate resources 
to expand its influence in the region and, possibly, attract Taiwan’s 
diplomatic partners.
Taiwan’s aid program and its projection towards 
Latin America and the Caribbean
The International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF), 
(                                             in traditional Chinese), located in Shilin 
District in Taipei, is the principal Taiwanese government agency 
responsible of development aid programs and their relative planning, 
executing, and monitoring. It is on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs –MOFA– as well as conducting its own independently funded 
technical assistance programs Taiwanese foreign aid programs began 
in 1959, with the deployment to Vietnam and to decolonized African 
nations (the so called “Operation Vanguard”) of agriculture experts 
to offer technical assistance to increase crop production. In 1962, the 
initial African task force was extended into the Sino-Africa Technical 
Cooperation Committee, merged into the Committee of International 
Technical Cooperation –CITC– in 1972. Following Taiwanese exceptional 
economic growth, the International Economic Cooperation Development 
Fund –IECDF– was created in 1989 with the objective of providing 
foreign economic assistance. With the multiplication of development 
projects, in 1996, ROC government created the ICDF as an independent 
organization, incorporating both IECDF and CITC (Her, 2012) as a 
key instrument for Taiwanese outreach to its diplomatic partners in the 
developing world (ICDF, 2010). The removal of “economic” from the 
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name of the agency reflects MOFA’s preference to consider development 
aid as a means to serve ROC’s diplomacy (rather than economic) 
interests (Tubilewicz, 2016, p. 50).
ICDF mission is “promoting humanitarianism, economic progress and 
sustainable development while advancing Taiwan’s diplomatic interests. 
To do so, the agency focuses on technical cooperation, human resources 
development, humanitarian assistance, lending and investment, overseas 
volunteers and overseas youth services” (Her, 2012). The ICDF identifies 
four core operations: “lending and investment, technical cooperation, 
humanitarian assistance, and international education and training” as well 
as to offer “provide aid in the event of natural disasters or international 
refugee crises (ICDF, 2019). To ensure its aid effectiveness, the ICDF has 
established key performance indicators to assess project outputs, outcomes 
and impacts” (ICDF former secretary-general Tao, quoted in Her, 2012).
As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs –MOFA– claims in its “Foreign 
Policy Guidelines”, Taiwan efforts are directed at “implementing policies 
that enhance Taiwan’s prosperity and promoting foreign relations that 
strengthen the international status of the ROC” as well as in “making 
concrete contributions to the global community, and enhancing its 
international profile through economic and humanitarian air policies” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Such policies include not only 
governmental bilateral assistance, such as grants and in-kind contributions, 
but also cooperation provided through international non-governmental 
organization (e.g. the Pan American Development Foundation - PADF), 
and civil society organizations, corporate donors and individual citizens 
(Lin & Lin, 2017).
Due to its development experience (and the fact that it achieved an 
extensive economic growth in spite of being located in an area prone to 
earthquakes, typhoons and other natural disasters), Taiwan claims to 
have the ability to provide help, inspiration, empathy and cooperation 
over issues of development, recovery and resilience that its partners are 
facing. Data from the PADF and the ICDF shows that the communities 
that received Taiwanese aid have largely benefitted from it, in terms of 
increased agricultural outputs and improved food security, incomes 
generation, increased resilience and recovery from natural disasters 
(PADF, 2016; ICDF, 2019). These aid programs offer a value for those 
recipient countries that is convincing enough to maintain ties with Taipei 
in spite of Beijing’s pressure. 
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Quantifying Taiwanese aid 
In recent years, Taiwanese foreign aid reached considerable levels, 
amounting its total budget to 438 million USD in 2010, 332 million in 2012, 
299 million in 2013 and 290 million in 2015 (there is no data on the total 
aid budget after 2015) (MOFA, as cited in Harold, Morris & Ma, 2019). In 
Figure 1 below, in order to represent the relative importance of the region 
in the respective aid program of each donor, I show the percentage of 
their total Official Development Aid –ODA– budget that is allocated to 
Latin America and the Caribbean from a variety of donors. In this graph, I 
compare the amounts of aid allocated by Taiwan with allocation by China, 
the United States of America, Germany, Japan, Spain and the average 
donor member of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, divided 
by historical phases (following Maggiorelli, 2017). Unfortunately, I don’t 
have sufficient data for Taiwan to be able to disaggregate Taiwanese total 
aid budget by region in the last phase (after 2006), since it is deemed to be 
confidential by the Taiwanese MOFA. As it can be observed, Taiwan has 
historically dedicated between 30% and 50% of its budget to LAC region, 
second only to Spain (which is providing between 40 to 60 percent of its 
budget to this region). That happens despite the fact that Taipei doesn’t 
have a great economic or cultural interest in the region. Japan does not 
particularly focus on LAC, allocating less than 5% of its aid budget to the 
region, while China has increased its focus on LAC in the recent phase, 
increasing its aid allocation to the region to more than 15% of its total aid 
budget. From this graph, is evident the greater relative importance of LAC 
region for China and Taiwan as compared to the other donors (except 
Spain), despite their geographical distance.
Coming to the composition of Taiwanese foreign aid to Latin America 
and the Caribbean, most of its aid (up to 90%) is provided in the form of 
direct assistance. The rest is composed by aid channeled through the ICDF 
(around 8-9) and the rest is transferred to international non-governmental 
organizations (Harold, Morris & Ma, 2019). Unfortunately, the itemized 
details of Taiwanese aid are deemed confidential by Taiwanese MOFA and 
are thus unavailable.
For instance, Taiwanese development assistance has been particularly 
significant to Caribbean states that otherwise would not have been 
economically self-sufficient, being Taiwan their principal donor. For 
example, in the case of Republic of Haiti, Taiwanese foreign aid has 
equaled in several years a fifth of the Haitian government’s annual budget 
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(Rich, 2010). In the case of Honduras, Taiwan reportedly conceded since 
2006 more than 205 million USD in loans and $27 million in grants, as 
well as donating a private jet to be used as the president’s official airplane 
(Menchu, 2017). In Guatemala, is funding a 680 million USD four-lane 
freeway to Puerto Barrios, for which Taipei will provide 250 million USD 
in grants and 350 million USD in loans. In the case of Belize, as well as 
owning 10% of its external debt, Taiwan also signed a 60 million USD 
cooperation agreement, which includes 20 million USD in grants and 40 
million in loan financing.
Latin America and the Caribbean are largest recipients of ICDF 
projects, amounting to more than 152 million USD over the past 15 years 
(Harold, Morris & Ma, 2019). As shown in Figure 2 below, the ICDF 
officially implemented 180 projects in 10 LAC countries: 95 in Central 
America (of which 33 under implementation), 64 in the Caribbean (of 
which 21 under completion) and 21 in South America (8 currently being 
implemented).
 
Figure 1. ODA amounts to LAC by selected donor countries
Note: no data available for China for phase 4 (1990-1995) and for Taiwan for 
phase 6 (2007-2016).
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from Bartke (1989), CIA (1975-
1984), OECD (1987, 2017), AidData (2017) and Dreher & Fuchs (2012).
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Figure 2. Taiwanese aid to Latin America and the Caribbean, number of projects 
by sub-region, 2010-2019
As displayed in Figure 3 below, Honduras, with 29 projects, is the 
major recipient of Taiwanese development assistance projects, followed 
by Haiti (25 projects) and Nicaragua and Guatemala (23 projects each). 
As can be observed in Figure, Taiwan concentrates its cooperation efforts 
into the countries with whom it maintains official diplomatic ties, being 
Ecuador the only country in LAC which is receiving aid from Taiwan 
despite recognizing the PRC.
Figure 3. Taiwanese aid to Latin America and the Caribbean: number of projects, 
2010-2019
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It has also to be noted that in the official information reported by 
the ICDF in 2019, data relative to countries that recently withdrew their 
recognition of the ROC appears to have been removed. That is the case 
of Panama, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless, in 
older reports we can find that Taiwan had indeed several projects active 
in those countries as well. For example, in 2017, there were two active 
technical assistance projects in Panama, 12 active projects in El Salvador 
(10 technical assistance, 2 lending), and 5 technical assistance projects in 
Dominican Republic (ICDF, 2017, pp. 97-98), which today result as completed 
projects. Following San Salvador decision to toughen diplomatic ties, Taipei 
has transferred six of its aid programs (of which four were dedicated to 
agricultural and aquaculture technologies) from El Salvador to Nicaragua. 
This last country hosts now the largest Taiwanese team and manages a budget 
of around 3 million USD (Hsu, 2018). The fact that Taiwan redirected its 
programs to another country when El Salvador made stricter its official 
diplomatic ties is a further indication that foreign aid is chiefly important 
for Taiwan as a foreign policy tool (rather than being moved by purely 
humanitarian motives). In this sense, it is also imperative to remember 
the pressure against working with the ICDF that is coming from China in 
countries that recognize the PRC. In some cases (such as Turkey and Egypt, 
mentioned by Lee, 1993, p. 53), this pressure has been prompted to reject 
substantial aid offers by Taiwan. In these countries, Taiwan admittedly 
prefers to “collaborate with them through international organizations or 
international non-governmental organization to overcome this situation” 
(ICDF Deputy Secretary-General Lee Pai-po, as quoted in Herrera, 2019).
IDCF operations can be categorized in four specific areas of 
intervention: (1) lending and investment, (2) technical cooperation, (3) 
humanitarian assistance, and (4) international education and training 
(ICDF, 2019). As shown in Figure 2 below, of the 180 projects within these 
ten countries, technical cooperation is the main modality of ICDF projects 
in LAC (104 projects), followed by humanitarian assistance (44 projects), 
Lending and Investment (23 projects), International Education and 
Training (7 projects) and uncategorized projects (2 projects).
The large and increasing share of technical cooperation projects 
(57% of the total) reflects Taiwanese awareness of the importance to 
coordinate with and involve the recipient in the transfer of expertise, in 
contrast with lending and investment which is a more direct form of aid. 
This emphasis on technical cooperation differs from the PRC, which 
underscores infrastructural development. 
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In Latin America, Taiwanese aid reflect the need of these countries 
of investment in strategic national industries such as support to 
agricultural productivity, microfinance to foster small and medium 
enterprises, information technology, health, etc. In the Caribbean, which 
has a narrower economic base than Latin America (Nicholson, 2015; 
Morgan, 2017), Taiwan support is directed mostly to agriculture and 
tourism (industries highly vulnerable to climate change). In summary, 
through ICDF programs, Taiwan helped several partner nations in the 
LAC region. Among other development outcomes, ROC assisted local 
communities to improve farming outcomes and ensure greater resistance 
to vulnerability, preparing for and recovering from natural disasters and 
crop disease.
What remains to be understood is how far Taiwanese aid programs 
could influence recipient governments in their diplomatic recognition 
decisions, avoiding the trap of being continuously threatened to be 
abandoned in favor of China. That is a permanent risk due the fact that 
LAC countries could pressure the ROC in order to extract more resources, 
grants and loans to maintain diplomatic ties.
Means of leverage vis-à-vis the PRC
Taiwanese aid to Latin American and the Caribbean countries, as a tool of 
foreign policy, is supported by other means of leverage: Taiwanese trade 
Figure 4. Taiwanese aid to Latin America and the Caribbean: project sector, 
2010-2019
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and investment; their common identity as democratic nations; Taipei’s 
participation in regional organizations; LAC historical ties with United 
States (the main sponsor of Taiwan in the region), which could give 
Taiwan an advantage as compared to China. 
Trade means only has a relative importance: even if the total bilateral 
trade volume with LAC countries has been over 12 billion USD in 2018, 
it only represents 2% of total Taiwanese trade (as shown in Figure 5 
below). That is well below trade levels from the PRC (which totaled 
$306 billion in 2018). Taiwan’s biggest partner in the region is Brazil 
(totaling US$3.86 billion in trade and US$500 million in investments in 
2017), followed by Mexico (US$2.96 billion in trade and US$1.1 billion 
in investment in 2017) and Chile (US$1.61 billion in trade and US$14 
million in investment). In fact, the vast majority of bilateral trade is 
happening with countries which do not hold formal diplomatic relations 
with the ROC. However several LAC countries that recognize Taiwan 
have established with the ROC Free Trade Agreements and Economic 
Cooperation Agreements, such as Panama (coming into effect as January, 
2004), Guatemala (July 2006), Nicaragua (January 2008), El Salvador 
(March 2008), Honduras (July 2008) and Paraguay (signed in July 2017, 
not yet in effect as June of 2019). Furthermore, the economic relationship 
with the ROC has a particular importance for the ICT industry, with 
substantial investments by Taiwanese enterprises such as Foxconn, Asus, 
Compal Electronics, Acer, Braview, New Kinpo, ADATA, Advantech, Delta, 
Portwell, Askey, Pegatron, etc. (MOEA, 2019).
Figure 5. Total Taiwanese Bilateral Trade (Exports and Imports), by region, 
2018
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Recent literature underlined how the increase or potential increase 
in trade with the PRC may explain LAC countries decision to switch 
recognition, arguing that foreign aid is not effective as “a primary method 
in maintaining allies” (Rich & Dahmer, 2018). Consequently, LAC 
countries and especially the Caribbean states (due to their lack natural 
resources and limited potential for economic growth) can expect to be 
actively courted by Beijing. 
A second means of leverage that is often mentioned in previous 
literature is Taipei’s ability “to embed itself and in some cases create 
regional institutions” (Rich & Dahmer, 2017). In fact, through its financial 
assistance, Taiwan has sustained political integration projects in LAC, 
such as the Sistema de Integración Centroamericano –SICA– and the Secretaria 
de Integración Económica Centroamericana –SIECA– (SICA’s economic 
wing), becoming its main donor. This project includes assistance in the 
construction of the building that houses its secretariat. Furthermore, 
Taiwan coordinates its aid programs with SICA. Additionally, since 1992, 
Taiwan is an extra-regional partner country of the Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration (Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica, 
BCIE), contributing US$150 million to the bank. Moreover, Taiwan is an 
allied of several regional developmental banks, such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank –IADB– (Rich & Dahmer, 2017).
Third, some authors consider Taiwan’s positive image in LAC as a 
very important factor to build durable support (Alexander, 2014). In their 
view, Taiwan has demonstrated a trajectory of international solidarity 
and shared values such as democracy and respect of human rights. On 
the one hand, it is true that Taiwan is ranked very highly in terms of 
political freedom, following Japan as the second freest country in Asia. 
Furthermore, Taiwan has achieved a better score than established Western 
democracies such as France and Italy (Freedom House, 2018). On the 
other hand, nevertheless, countries with formal ties with the ROC in 
the region present a mixed democracy record. While four of its partners 
(Belize, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent & the Grenadines) are 
ranked as free countries, five of them (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Haiti and Paraguay) are ranked as only “partly free” by the Freedom 
House. The same mixed record results from the observation of corruption 
rankings. Out of nine partners of Taiwan in the region, the same five 
“partly free” countries (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti and 
Paraguay) also scored below the world median in the 2018 Corruption 
Perception Index (Transparency International, 2019). Only two partners 
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are ranked above the median (St. Lucia and St. Vincent & the Grenadines; 
Belize and St. Kitts & Nevis are not ranked by TI). Furthermore, in an 
evidently contradictory fashion for a regime proud of democracy, human 
rights and liberal values, ROC bilateral aid has also been linked to cases of 
corruption in the region. For example, the former President of Guatemala 
Alfonso Portillo admitted in court in 2014 to have received bribes from 
Taiwan for 2.5 million USD in exchange for diplomatic recognition. The 
former president of El Salvador Francisco Flores was charged for the 
disappearance of 10 million USD in donations from Taiwan directed to 
2001 earthquake’s victims (Malkin, 2017).
Finally, perhaps the most important means of leverage that Taiwan 
can use vis-à-vis China seems to be the pressure that the US can put 
on its current and potential diplomatic allies. In fact, US officials 
have confidentially tried to dissuade LAC countries to terminate their 
diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Following Panama’s recognition 
of Beijing, US publicly proclaimed the importance for all concerned 
parts to “to engage in productive dialogue and to avoid escalatory or 
destabilizing moves”, calling for resumption of cross-strait talks (Chiang 
& Hsu, 2018), and hailing Taiwan as be “a vital partner, a democratic 
success story and a force for good in the world” that deserves US strong 
support (Katina Adams, spokeswoman for the US Department of State’s 
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, as quoted in Lu & Hsiao, 
2017). The US supported Taiwan regarding also El Salvador recognition 
switch. The White House Press Secretary voiced the Washington’s “grave 
concern” and stated that the pro-Beijing diplomatic choice would result 
in “a reevaluation of our relationship with El Salvador” (Statement from 
the Press Secretary on El Salvador, 2018). In an unprecedented move, 
the US recalled its diplomats to the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
and Panama “for consultations related to recent decisions to no longer 
recognize Taiwan”. The US expressed “concern over the rising number 
of countries that have cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of China”, 
warning that China’s economic stimuli to countries switching recognition 
to Beijing would “facilitate economic dependency and domination, not 
partnership” (Beech, 2018). In addition, Washington menaced to reduce 
“U.S. foreign aid for those countries that downgrade relations with Taiwan” 
(Sullivan & Lum, 2018, p. 2.). For Taiwan, highlighting the importance of a 
containment strategy towards the PRC would play in line with Washington’s 
preferences. This could be supplemented by an increase of economic links 
with US, providing incentives to regional partners to continue recognizing 
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the ROC. By providing information, technical assistance, and governance-
strengthening initiatives, the United States could limit the increase of 
unwelcome by-products of China’s engagement in Latin America, (such as 
economic displacement, corruption, and organized crime) (Ellis, 2018b).
Potential developments
The advance of PRC in the region has raised the question of who, 
among Taiwan’s remaining partners, will be the next in rescinding 
diplomatic relations with Taipei, attracted by the benefits associated 
with the recognition of Beijing. Outside the strict circle of politicians 
and negotiators of such option, it is difficult to know with certainty. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that all Taipei’s diplomatic partners are at least 
considering the possibility, evaluating the benefits and the risks associated 
with a switch in their diplomatic stance. Possibly, the hard stance of the US 
regarding the change of recognition of Panama, the Dominican Republic 
and El Salvador led other countries in LAC to delay a decision on the 
subject. In all remaining partners there are actors (such as politicians, 
businessmen, etc.) who are enticed by the prospects of increased business 
opportunities with Beijing. Meanwhile, others oppose furthering the 
relations with the mainland because of the increased competition by 
Chinese products for local manufacturers. They also stress the risks 
associated with the betrayal of loyalty towards Taiwan and the US, and the 
estrangement from values such as democracy and human right that such a 
move would entail (Ellis, 2018a).
In Paraguay, current president Mario Abdo Benitez seems inclined to 
maintain its ties with Taiwan. He was able to negotiate an agreement with 
Taipei to redouble its aid commitments during his presidency as compared 
to the money received by his predecessor (reaching the sum of 150 million 
USD during five years). Nevertheless, China is potentially a very important 
market for Paraguay’s agricultural produce, especially soy beans, as 
evidenced by the presence in Paraguay of Chinese firm COFCO (China 
Oilseeds and Foodstuffs Corporation) (Ellis, 2018a). 
In Nicaragua, Sandinista government’s relations with Taiwan are 
apparently stable. In 1979 when the Sandinista Front arrived to the power, 
Daniel Ortega switched his country’s recognition from Taipei to Beijing. 
However, in 1995, during Violeta Chamorro’s presidency, Nicaragua 
returned to the Republic of China. Before returning to the presidency, 
Ortega threatened restore relations with the People’s Republic of China. 
But finally, after his reelection in 2007, he stated that Nicaragua did not 
recognize the One China Policy and decided to maintain diplomatic 
relations with the Republic of China. Nevertheless, as part of his strategy 
to diversify economic and trade relations, Ortega is trying to play both 
sides, courting the People’s Republic of China without upsetting his 
country’s relations with Taiwan, with whom he established a free trade 
agreement. For example, in an attempt to establish direct trade relations 
with China (nowadays Nicaragua is buying Chinese products through 
Panama, the US, Costa Rica and Mexico), Managua hosted “ExpoChina” 
trade show in 2010 (Rogers, 2010). However, in February 2019, Ortega 
accepted a US$100 million loan offered by Taiwan (Herrera, 2019). Thus, 
for the moment “there is no indication that Ortega plans to change the 
status quo with respect to Taiwan” (Ellis, 2018a). Regarding Belize, the 
position of Belmopan also seems to be firm, with Taiwanese President 
Tsai paying a visit in August 2018. While Taiwan is continuing to provide 
substantial aid to Belize, there is some discontent because Taiwan is 
providing much more aid to its neighboring and rival country, Guatemala 
(Ramos, 2017). Regarding the latter, Guatemala’s relations with Taipei 
is more uncertain: despite the great amounts of aid received by Taiwan, 
Guatemala’s officials also expressed an interest in the potential benefits 
from a formal relationship with China. Moreover, given the internal 
political instability, President Jimmy Morales may elude Western pressures 
(and possible sanctions) by turning to Beijing. In Honduras, as well, 
political instability may lead Juan Orlando Hernandez to approach 
the PRC, a partner that doesn’t interfere with internal affairs such as 
criminal activities, human rights violations or the prosecution of political 
oppositions (Ellis, 2018a).
In El Salvador, on the contrary, the situation seems to be turning 
again in favor of Taipei. El Salvador’s President-elect Nayib Bukele, willing 
to renovate a positive relationship with Washington (possibly hurt by El 
Salvador’s turn to Beijing), is considering the possibility to reverse the 
decision to switch recognition from Taiwan to China, since such decision 
benefitted only the outgoing government. As Bukele put it, “China does 
not play by the rules; they do not respect the rules”. He criticized Chinese 
development packages because “they develop projects that are not feasible, 
leaving countries with huge debt that cannot be paid back and use that as 
financial leverage” (Gao, 2019). Nevertheless, “that decision has not been 
taken”, as of March 14, 2019 (Yeh, 2019). As an indicator of the uncertainty, 
Beijing has not formally opened its embassy in San Salvador and it is still 
operating from the Sheraton Hotel in the country’s capital.
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In the Caribbean, the situation is even more unpredictable than 
in Central and South America, since smaller countries are much more 
susceptible to the “dollar diplomacy” of Beijing and Taipei. In Haiti, 
Taiwan has provided substantial development aid and it is supporting 
Jovenel Moise’s government, although there is some discontent for the 
delay in the delivery of a 150 million USD loan promised by Taiwan when 
Moise travelled to Taipei. The tiny nations of the Lesser Antilles (St. 
Vincent, St. Lucia, and St. Kitts and Nevis) seem to maintain good relations 
with Taiwan, even though they receive visits from Chinese businessmen 
promising significant investment projects.
Conclusion
In the last half century, Taiwan foreign aid activities have been important 
to promote the image of a nation willing to be involved in global affairs, 
promoting international development and offering humanitarian 
assistance. That contributes to the ROC’s efforts to break international 
isolation and establish official diplomatic ties with an (admittedly small) 
number of developing countries. As we have seen in this article, Latin 
America and the Caribbean represent an important scenario in the rivalry 
between China and Taiwan for international diplomatic recognition, since 
slightly more than half of countries recognizing Taiwan are located in 
the region. In this competition, foreign aid is being used by both sides as 
a public diplomacy tool, and the amounts of loans, grants and technical 
assistance to the region have been substantial. Both China and Taiwan 
allocate to LAC countries a generous share of their foreign aid budget 
as compared to other donors (only Spain focuses on LAC in a greater 
proportion). Beijing is clearly favorite in this struggle, due to its superior 
economic power and its position of permanent member of the UN Security 
council. PRC has used its leverage to enforce the so-called “One-China 
policy”, according to which other countries can only establish formal 
diplomatic ties with either the PRC or the ROC, but not with both at the 
same time. As a consequence, Taiwan has seen the number of countries 
that recognize it gradually diminish, reaching the lowest number of 17 
countries during 2018.
From LAC point of view, Taiwanese aid to the region undoubtedly 
offer an important contribution to regional development, as well as 
helping with disaster recovery and resilience in Caribbean islands and 
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Central American States. From Taiwanese perspective, its aid programs are 
important for its fundamental objective of maintaining some diplomatic 
recognition and, thus, avoid international isolation. Since Taipei cannot 
match Beijing “checkbook diplomacy” competition on a dollar for dollar 
base, Taiwan has been leveraging its comparative strengths: its reputation 
as an economic development miracle (potentially capable of substantial 
investment in the region in the ITC sector); its positive image as a country 
that promotes a form of development based on shared democratic values 
and human rights; its experience as a country able to resist a difficult 
natural environment that is subject to threats similar to those faced 
by LAC countries (such as hurricanes and earthquakes), and which is 
able to provide technical assistance to empower LAC communities (an 
approach that is very different from the top-down approach, focused on 
infrastructures, used by the PRC). Together with trade and investment 
relations, development aid plays a significant role to strengthen LAC 
ties to Taiwan. 
Nevertheless, coming to the question of whether Taiwan’s 
international status has been greatly improved by its aid programs, the 
answer that emerges from this article seems to be mixed. While Taipei 
has been relatively successful in the 1980s and 1990s, in the recent decade 
Taiwanese cooperation hasn’t succeeded in its diplomatic objectives. In 
particular, during the last three years following President Tsai’s election in 
Taiwan in 2016 (whose pro-independence statements have been considered 
unacceptable by Beijing), we assisted to significant renewed efforts by the 
PRC to impose a “one-China” policy in the region. That leverages potential 
increases in trade and investments, which in turn have been successful in 
prompting Panama, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic to cut their 
ties with Taipei and recognizing Beijing. Therefore, future research could 
focus on the importance of trade relations in LAC, rather than foreign 
assistance, for Taiwan recognition. In fact, all the evidence provided 
in this article indicates that, despite its considerable international aid 
efforts, Taipei cannot be too confident to succeed in retaining diplomatic 
recognition in the region. Facing the risk of further international isolation, 
the US and Taiwan are working together to find ways to encourage Latin 
American and Caribbean nations to maintain and improve their relations 
with Taiwan, thus extending the lifetime of the current status quo.
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